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Subsiding Away II: Will The Effects of
Garvey v. State Farm Slip and Slide?

Jeff Katofsky, Esq.*
I.

PROLOGUE

This time last year, I authored an article entitled Subsiding Away:
Can California Homeowners Recover from their Insurer for Subsidence Damages to their Homes?.' The article discussed the history
of concurrent causation law as it applied to subsidence losses and
insurance coverage for such losses. 2 The article also discussed an
insurance carrier's possible defenses to a subsidence claim by utilizing
exclusionary or prohibitive policy language.3 The article concluded
that the state of the law was in basic disarray 4 and flux and that
guidance from the supreme court was necessary.
When that article was written, the California Supreme Court had
not yet rendered its decision in Garvey v. State Farm,5 a case expected
to establish definitive standards and tests to be followed in the area
of concurrent causation. After a two and one-half year wait, the
California Supreme Court released the decision contemporaneously
* Jeff Katofsky, a graduate of Boalt Hall School of Law, is a partner in the Los
Angeles based law firm of Rezak & Katofsky, which handles corporate matters and general
litigation including business, construction, real estate and insurance. Mr. Katofsky has been
involved in the representation of over 100 litigants claiming insurance coverage for subsidence
damage to their homes.
1. Katofsky, Subsiding Away: Can CaliforniaHomeowners Recover From Their Insurer
for Subsidence Damages to their Homes? 20 PAc. L.J. 783 (1989) [hereinafter Katoisky].
2. Id. at 788-93.
3. Id. at 803-11.
4. Id. at 813.
5. Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 48 Cal. 3d 395, 770 P.2d 704, 257 Cal.
Rptr. 292 (1989).
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with the publication of my previous article. Unfortunately, instead
of resolving many of the issues surrounding the thousands of cases
presently flooding the California courts regarding insurance coverage
for subsidence damages, the California Supreme Court in Garvey
only muddied the waters further.
First, this article updates the law on concurrent causation and
proximate causation for subsidence losses and raises new issues and
questions which will arise from the California Supreme Court's
decision in Garvey.6 The remainder of this article is dedicated to the
explanation of the continued confusion in the lower courts, as
evidenced by post-Garvey decisions, regarding the validity and probability of enforcing the notice defenses to insurance claims for
7
subsidence losses.
II.

INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM

Over the years, hasty contractors have been more concerned with
the quantity of the homes they construct than with quality. As a
result, thousands of homeowners across California find themselves
living in homes damaged by subsidence. Subsidence damage is typically concurrently caused by earth movement in conjunction with
third-party negligence in the form of construction errors. Examples
of such errors are: 1) Negligent construction; 2) negligent or poor
design; 3) use of substandard fill material; 4) negligent compaction
of the soil; 5) defective work; 6) poor framing of the home, and 7)
improper grading of the land.8 The damage exposes itself in the form

of cracks and slippage in the home or underlying foundation.
California homeowners have turned to their insurance companies
for the requisite funds to repair their progressively damaged homes.
Insurers deny most claims by relying on exclusionary language in the
homeowner's policies for earth movement, faulty workmanship, faulty
design or losses concurrently caused. 9
Controversy in subsidence litigation has centered around two main
issues: First, the proper legal standard to determine coverage in
homeowner's insurance policies for subsidence damage to a home; 0

6. See infra notes 8-78 and accompanying text.
7.

See infra notes 79-137 and accompanying text.

8. Katofsky, supra note 1, at 784.
9. See Katofsky, supra note 1, for a full discussion on these issues.
10. This issue was the center of attention in Garvey.
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second, the validity of the various notice defenses contained within
the standard homeowner's insurance policy.'1 Although these issues
overlap in their practical application, no court has yet fully discussed
both issues within one set of facts.
Part III of this article focuses on the history of concurrent causation in reference to subsidence losses leading up to the Garvey
decision.' 2 Part IV discusses the California Supreme Court's decision
of Garvey." Part V delves into the ramifications and interpretation
of Garvey by other courts.' 4 Finally, Part VI explains the continued
conflicts and confusion among the lower courts with the law and
effects of the notice defenses contained5 within the standard homeowner's insurance policy since Garvey.1
III.

THE Sabella/Partridge CONTROVERSY

Prior to the Garvey decision, three lines of authority existed, and
may still exist, controlling concurrent causation coverage issues in
subsidence cases:' 6 (1) The doctrine that a policy exclusion is only
applicable if the excluded peril is the efficient, primary and proximate
cause of the loss; 17 (2) the concept of negligence as an insured peril
in an "All-Risk" policy where various forms of third-party negligence
or the insured's negligence is a covered risk of loss, absent a specific
exclusion; 8 and (3)the concurrent causation doctrine-that there can
be more than one proximate cause of any event-which dictates that
coverage exists if two distinct causes interact at the same time to
produce the given result, one of which is a covered peril.' 9
In Sabella v. Wisler,20 the California Supreme Court espoused the
"efficient cause test" for concurrently caused loses:
11. See Katofsky, supra note 1, at 803. See infra notes 96-129 and accompanying text
discussing the notice defenses.
12.

See infra notes 16-31 and accompanying text.

13.

See infra notes 32-67 and accompanying text.

14. See infra notes 94-137 and accompanying text.
15.
803.
16.

See infra notes 96-130 and accompanying text. See also Katofsky, supra note 1, at
Those lines of authority are more fully discussed in Katofsky, supra note 1, at 788.

17. See Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963) (concept
affirmed in Garvey).
18.

See Associated Eng'rs, Inc. v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 175 F. Supp. 352, 353 (N.D.

Cal. 1959); Premier Ins. Co. v. Welch, 140 Cal. App. 3d 720, 726, 189 Cal. Rptr. 657, 661
(1983) (concept affirmed in Garvey).
19. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d 94, 514 P.2d 123, 109
Cal. Rptr. 811 (1973) (attacked in Garvey as to its application in first-party property cases).
20. Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963).
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In determining whether a loss is within an exception in a policy,
where there is a concurrence of different causes, the efficient causethe one that sets others in motion-is the cause to which the loss
is to be attributed, though the other causes may follow it, and
operate more immediately in producing the disaster. The virtual
absence of subsidence damage in the prior four years of the existence
of the house here in question clearly indicates that the broken pipe
was the predominating or moving efficient cause of the loss. 2'

In Sabella, improper lot preparation caused a sewer line to break.
The leak resulted in lot subsidence damaging plaintiffs' home. The
plaintiffs made a claim to their insurance carrier under their "AllRisk" homeowners policy. The California Supreme Court, using the
efficient cause test, found that the subsidence damage was a covered
22
risk under the policy at issue.
The lower courts found the Sabella test basically unworkable and
began to expand it.21 Consequently, the California Supreme Court
reviewed the Sabella test in State Farm v. Partridge.4
In Partridge, State Farm issued both a homeowner's policy and
an automobile policy to the insured. The homeowner's policy excluded injuries arising out of "the use of an automobile." The trial
court found that the insured was negligent in driving his car off a
paved road onto rough terrain, causing a concealed magnum pistol
to discharge and injure his passenger. 25 The trial court also found
that the insured's modification of the gun to give it a "hair trigger
26
action" was negligent and independent of any "use" of the car.
The issue in the case was whether coverage existed under the
homeowner's policy for the insured's negligence in modifying the
gun. 27 The California Supreme Court, in finding the loss covered,
"
stated:

21. Id. at 31-32, 377 P.2d at 895, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 695 (quoting 6 COUCH, INSURANCE §
1463 (1930)).
22. Id.
23. See Strubble v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 35 Cal. App. 3d 498, 110 Cal. Rptr. 828
(1973) (the court held that an earthquake, an included cause, was the efficient cause of the
Strubble's loss as opposed to the excluded cause of earth movement); Gillis v. Sun Ins. Office,
Ltd., 238 Cal. App. 2d 408, 47 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1965) (court found that the dominant and
efficient cause of damage to a boat dock was the covered risk, the windstorm, as opposed to
the uncovered risk, water action and waves). See also Katofsky, supra note 1, at 791-92.
24. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d 94, 514 P.2d 123, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 811 (1973).
25. Id. at 99, 514 P.2d at 127, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
26. Id. at 100, 514 P.2d at 127, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
27. Id. at 102, 514 P.2d at 129, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
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Although there may be some question whether either of the two
causes in the instant case can be properly characterized as the
"prime", "moving" or "efficient" cause of the accident, we believe
that the coverage under a liability insurance policy is equally available to an insured whether an insured risk constitutes simply a

concurrent proximate cause of the "injuries."
Partridgebecame the leading case on multiple causation losses and
was applied to all concurrent losses occurring under an "All-Risk"
homeowners policy as well as liability policies. 29 The Partridge test
was simple and did not require the detailed expert geological and
scientific guesswork needed to apply the Sabella standard. As a
matter of course, trial courts and Courts of Appeal began to apply
the Partridgeanalysis to concurrent causation losses.30 However, as
the court implied in the Garvey opinion, the bench and bar have
been using the wrong standard of law for the past few decades. 31
IV.

GARvEY v. STATE FARm

In Garvey v. State Farm,32 a San Francisco law professor sued his
homeowner's insurance carrier, State Farm, when it refused to pay
for property damage under an "All-Risk" insurance policy. 33 The
Garveys lived in a sixty-year-old hillside home. In 1960, they added
a bedroom and deck. In August 1978, the bedroom addition physically separated from the rest of the house. During repairs, they
learned that the bedroom addition was built without footings or
structural connections to the house. The Garveys filed a claim with
their homeowner's carrier, but State Farm denied coverage relying
34
on the earth movement exclusion in the policy.
Seven months after the loss, State Farm offered to pay $11,500
under an agreement with plaintiffs that plaintiffs hold the money
while State Farm pursued its declaratory relief action to judgment.

28. Id. at 104-105, 514 P.2d at 130, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 818 (emphasis in original).
29. See Katofsky, supra note 1, at 793-98 and cases cited therein.
30. See Katofsky, supra note 1, at 793.
31. Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 48 Cal. 3d 395, 399, 770 P.2d at 704,
257 Cal. Rptr. 292, 293.
32. 48 Cal. 3d 395, 770 P.2d 704, 257 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1989).
33. Id. at 400, 770 P.2d at 706, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 293. For a discussion of the All-Risk
policy, see Katofsky, supra note 1, at 785-87.
34. Garvey, 48 Cal. 3d at 400, 770 P.2d at 705, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
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If State Farm prevailed, the Garveys were to return the money. 5
The Garveys were also required to waive all rights to sue State Farm
for bad faith or for any class action suit. 36 The Garveys refused the
37
tender and filed suit against State Farm for bad faith.
38 and Sabella v. Wisler,3 9 the
Relying on State Farm v. Partridge
trial court directed a verdict for the Garveys on the coverage issue.
The trial court held that the negligent construction on the addition
was a concurrent proximate cause of the damage to the home and,
thus, covered under the "All-Risk" policy despite the earth movement
exclusion.4o
The Court of Appeals for the First District reversed the trial court,
claiming that the issues of concurrent proximate causation must be
determined by the jury under an efficient proximate cause analysis. 4'
The California Supreme Court affirmed and attempted to set the test
for future juries to follow.
A.

The Return of Sabella

In Garvey, the majority tersely explained the past two decades of
multiple causation analyses. The majority explained that Sabella is,
and always has been, the test to be used in first-party multiple
causation insurance coverage cases, while Partridge must be limited
to third-party liability situations. The Garvey majority reiterated the
Sabella test as follows:
35.

Such an agreement is authorized by Johansen v. CaliforniaState Auto. Ass'n Inter-

Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975). If State Farm had
prevailed, the Garveys would have to return the money. Johansen allows a carrier to pay the
insured and sue for declaratory relief, asking for return of the money, without those acts
being interpreted as acts of bad faith.
36. Garvey, 48 Cal. 3d at 400, 770 P.2d at 706, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 294.
37. Id.
38. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d 94, 514 P.2d 123, 109 Cal.

Rptr. 811 (1973).
39. 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963).
40. Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 48 Cal. 3d 395, 400-01, 770 P.2d 704,
706, 257 Cal. Rptr. 292, 294. The California Supreme Court explained:
The [trial] court informed the parties it was following the decisions in Partridge...
and Sabella ... and that plaintiffs were covered under the policy because negligent

construction, a covered risk, was a concurrent proximate cause of the damage.
Specifically, the trial court stated: "(The Supreme Court) told me in Sabella that
negligent construction can be a proximate cause. They told me in Partridgethere
may be coverage wherever an insured risk constitutes simply a concurrent proximate
cause of the injuries."
Id.
41. 227 Cal. Rptr. 209, 219 (1986), vacated 48 Cal. 3d 395, 770 P.2d 704, 257 Cal. Rptr.
292 (1989).
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Sabella ... set forth a workable rule of coverage that provides a
fair result within the reasonable expectations of both the insured
and the insurer whenever there exists a causal or dependent relationship between covered and excluded perils. In multiple cause
cases, a proximate cause analysis, focusing on the efficient proximate
cause, could be employed to determine whether or not the insured
was covered for the loss under the property portion of the homeowner's insurance policy. 42

The majority maintained that it was necessary to restate the Sabella
standard since courts had been misapplying the standard (using the
Partridgestandard of proximate causation) over the past two dec-

ades. 43 Without discussing much of the history or progress surrounding concurrent causation case law, 44 the court simply and briefly,
narrowed the issue to one of applying different coverage standards
45
depending on the insured's status; i.e. first or third party.
1. First and Third-PartyDifferences
The majority explained that first-party property contract concepts
cannot be confused, or combined, with third-party tort liability
concepts:
Property insurance ... is an agreement, a contract, in which the

insurer agrees to indemnify the insured in the event that the insured
property suffers a covered loss. [Citation ommitted].
On the other hand, the right to coverage in the third-party liability
insurance context draws on traditional tort concepts of fault, proximate cause and duty. This liability analysis differs substantially

from the coverage analysis in the property insurance context, which
draws on the relationship between perils that are either covered or
excluded in the contract. In liability insurance, by insuring for
personal liability, and agreeing to cover the insured for his own
negligence, the insurer agrees to cover the insured for a broader
spectrum of risks. 46

42. Garvey, 48 Cal. 3d at 404, 770 P.2d at 708, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 296.
43. Id. at 399, 770 P.2d at 705, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
44. See id. at 437, 770 P.2d at 731, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 319 (Broussard, J., dissenting). See
also Katofsky, supra note 1, explaining prior case law.
45. Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 48 Cal. 3d 395, 405, 770 P.2d 704, 709,
257 Cal. Rptr. 292, 297.
46. Id. at 406-07, 770 P.2d at 710, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
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The majority distinguished Partridge by claiming that it was a
third-party liability situation, not a first-party property case. Essentially, the court separated Partridgeand Sabella and left two different
coverage tests depending on the status of the parties and their
"injuries." The court stated:
Partridge never considered in what manner concurrent causation
could apply in a first-party property insurance context. Rather, by

recognizing in Partridgethe "novel question" of liability coverage
presented because two separate acts of negligence simultaneously
joined together to cause an injury, we also impliedly recognize the
limited scope of our holding. We do not extend our holding to the
first-party property insurance cases. Accordingly, we should not
apply the decision to such
cases merely because it appears to simplify
47
the coverage analysis.
2. Misapplication by Lower Courts
The Garvey majority chided lower courts for misapplying Partridge
to first-party multiple causation cases. The majority noted that the
appellate court in Garvey was on the right track in its attempt to set
out an analytical framework for other courts to follow in concurrent
causation losses, but that the court's fatal flaw was to give any
weight to the Partridgedecision in a first-party case. 4 The majority's
test for a first-party property case completely excludes any of the
holdings in the Partridgecase.
The Garvey majority noted that other appellate courts, and the
Garvey trial court, have inappropriately applied Partridge to firstparty concurrent causation loses for the last two decades. 49 The
Garvey majority explained that the trial court erred in directing a
50
verdict for the insured based on both Sabella and Partridge.
Although the majority felt it necessary to separate Partridgefrom
Sabella, such diverging lines of authority will cause confusion rather
than providing answers and workable analyses by leaving different
tests to determine coverage depending on the insured's status.

47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

405, 770 P.2d at
409-10, 770 P.2d
410-11, 770 P.2d
412, 770 P.2d at

709, 257 Cal. Rptr. at
at 712, 257 Cal. Rptr.
at 713, 257 Cal. Rptr.
714, 257 Cal. Rptr. at

297.
at 300.
at 301.
302.
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B. Kaufman's Concurrence
Justice Kaufman, joined by Justice Panelli, concurred separately
and urged the court to go one step further. Recognizing the difficulties by having two separate standards in which to determine
coverage depending on the insured's status,-" Justice Kaufman urged

the court to overrule Partridge.2
Justice Kaufman found two major flaws in the Partridgedecision.
First, Partridge mixed tort principles of proximate and concurrent
causation and applied them to contract principles in finding coverage
under the "All-Risk" policy. Justice Kaufman argued that although
a party may be liable under tort law, an insurer may not be if the
same facts are applied under contract principles. 3 Second, Justice
Kaufman felt that the supreme court in Partridge mischaracterized
the facts of that case as "independent" of one another.5 4 Acts must
be "truly independent" of one another for a Partridge-typeanalysis
to apply, but Justice Kaufman felt that Partridge did not present
such a case.5
The difficulty with Justice Kaufman's analysis is the "secondguess" approach of discussing the Partridgecase. The Partridgecourt
was determining a standard to be applied in concurrent causation
cases where insurance coverage contract principles were the issue.
The Partridgecourt decided that the tort principle of proximate cause
should be applied to coverage under an "All-Risk" insurance contract
if a proximate cause of the loss was an included risk. 6 Justice
Kaufman's discussion of "independent" and "dependent" risks stems
from a footnote in the Partridge case and could not have played a
vital role in the court's decision.57 Thus, as pointed out in Justice
Broussard's dissent to the Garvey majority, the majority reached a
clear result, but lacked adequate authority to obtain that result.

51.
52.
53.

Id. at 413, 770 P.2d at 715, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 303 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
Id. at 416, 770 P.2d at 717, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 305 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
Id. at 414, 770 P.2d at 715, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 304 (Kaufman, J., concurring).

54. Id. (Kaufman, J., concurring).
55. Id. (Kaufman, J., concurring).
56. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d 94, 104-05, 514 P.2d 123,
130, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811, 818.
57. See id. at 104, n.10, 514 P.2d at 130 n.10, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 818 n.10.
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C. The Dissenting Opinions: A Plea for Fairness

1. Justice Mosk's Dissent
Justice Mosk, in his dissent, would apply the following test when
a concurrent causation subsidence coverage issue arises:
When two risks, one included within the coverage of the policy and
the other excluded, concur as proximate causes in producing a loss
and are dependent-i.e., when one sets the other in motion-there
is coverage if the included risk triggers the excluded, but not if the
excluded triggers the included. When, however, the included and
excluded risks concur as proximate causes in producing a loss and
are independent-i.e., when one does not set the other in motioncoverage exists in all cases.3 8
Justice Mosk's "Sabella-Partridge" rule 9 establishes a workable

formula to handle all concurrent causation situations. The Sabella
portion of the test is used if the causes of the loss are dependent on
one another. For example, subsidence damage caused by water leaking from an open pipe infiltrates the soil to cause earth movement
and damage to the structure above. Clearly, the causes of the loss
(water and earth movement) are dependent on one another since
neither could occur to cause damage without the other. Since the
water set the earth movement in motion, it is the triggering cause of
the loss. If the water leak is a covered loss under an "All-risk"
policy, the whole loss is covered. If the water leak is excluded, the
loss is not covered even if earth movement is covered.
The Partridgeportion of the Sabella-Partridgeanalysis is utilized
when the causes of the loss are independent of one another. For
instance, suppose an earthquake and a fire occur simultaneously to
destroy the structure. Either tragedy would have completely destroyed
the premises independent of the other. If either the earthquake or
the fire are covered losses under the "All-risk" policy, the loss is
covered.

58. Garvey v. State Farm, Fire & Casualty Co., 48 Cal. 3d 395, 416, 770 P.2d 704, 717,
257 Cal. Rptr. 292, 305 (Mosk, J., dissenting). This approach was not addressed by the Court
of Appeals for the First District in Garvey.
59. Id. at 426, 770 P.2d at 724, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 312 (Mosk, J., dissenting).

740
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2.

Justice Broussard'sDissent

Like Justice Kaufman, Justice Broussard, in his separate dissenting
opinion, looked to contract interpretation for the answer to the
insurance coverage controversy. 60 Discerning the difference between
an "All-Risk" policy and a "Specified-peril" policy, 61 Justice Broussard explained that to exclude a loss because the efficient cause of
62
the loss is excluded defeats the purpose of an "All-Risk" policy.

Even if the immediate cause of the loss is covered, the loss would
be excluded if the "efficient" cause is not covered under the majority
63
rationale.
Justice Broussard explained:
When an insured looks at his policy and sees specific insured causes
and numerous exclusions, he often may reasonably conclude that
the insured causes and excluded causes are mutually exclusive. As
to many of the excluded causes, it may be difficult, if not impossible,
to conceive of a situation where the excluded cause and the insured
cause could combine to cause a loss. Thus he may reasonably
conclude that the insurer out of an abundance of caution has sought
to make clear that there is no coverage where an excluded cause
alone causes the loss and never turn his mind to the rare possibility
that the excluded cause and the insured cause might combine to
cause a loss. For example, an insured purchasing a fire policy on
his home believes that, if his home burns, he will be paid; he does
not think that the 25 or 50 exclusions in his policy exclude 25 or
50 types of fires unless the policy makes it abundantly clear by
express statement or necessary implication. 64
Justice Broussard believed that the reasonable expectation of the
insured purchasing an "All-Risk" policy is coverage of all types of
losses except those specifically excluded. The majority, however, felt
that the "All-Risk" policy should be limited to all included risks
which are efficient proximate causes of the loss. 65 Unfortunately, the

60. Id. at 433-34, 770 P.2d at 729, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 317 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
61. In a specified-peril policy, the insurer and insured determine precisely which risks will
be insured and set the premium payments accordingly. For example, neither party would expect
the insurer to pay for a theft under a policy which only covers fire losses. In an "All-Risk"
policy, all losses except those specifically excluded are covered.
62. Garvey, 48 Cal. 3d at 434, 770 P.2d at 729, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 316 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
63. Id. (Broussard, J., dissenting).
64. Id. (Broussard, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
65. Garvey, 48 Cal. 3d at 408, 770 P.2d at 711, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
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California Supreme Court, which had the opportunity to set a
workable, definitive standard for concurrently caused losses, concurrently caused more confusion for the lower courts than it solved.
V. THE EF

CTS OF GARvBY

The supreme court established two definitive rulings in Garvey.
First, it is now clear that third-party negligence is a covered peril
under an "All Risk of Physical Loss" homeowner's policy. 66 Second,
the efficient proximate cause doctrine will be the test applied to
multiple causation losses in a first-party property situation. 67 Nothing
else is clear. Nothing else was addressed by the court.
A.

Concurrent Causation Standards

The Garvey court failed to establish any standard to be applied in
situations where the causes are concurrent/simultaneous, whether
first or third-party. 68 Nor did the court determine how to handle
non-concurrent multiple causation problems in third-party cases.
Instead of selecting one standard as the Partridge standard had
done for all multiple or concurrent causation coverage issues, the
court decided to segregate the coverage analysis into first and thirdparty situations. By also ignoring concurrent causation losses, which
include the bulk of the present subsidence litigation, the court has
left the appellate and trial courts without any standard to apply.
Potentially, there could be four different tests for the same type of
subsidence loss.
1. The Sabella test will be applied to first-party property cases

which involve multiple causation, as in Garvey;
2. Garvey left open which test applies in first-party concurrent
causation losses;
3. A Partridge analysis will be applied in the third-party context
when the losses are concurrent; and

4. It is presently unclear what test the court would require in a
third-party situation with non-concurrent multiple causation.

66. Id.
67. Id. at 412, 770 P.2d at 714, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 302.
68. First-party cases are claims made by the insured against his or her carrier. Thirdparty cases are those by a third party against the liability portion of another person's insurance
policy.
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B.

Doomed to Trial

The application of the Sabella standard, when applicable, could
produce bizarre results. For example, as Justice Broussard explained:
Assuming that in multiple-cause cases we must choose between
coverage where the insured cause is the efficient cause and where
it is the immediate cause, common sense should tell us that there
should be coverage when the immediate rather than efficient cause
of loss is insured. An insured who has his house burn as a result
of a fire from a nearby falling tree has a greater expectation that
his fire insurance will provide coverage than he has when a fire
causes the tree to fall crushing the house. But under the majority's
rules, an exclusion for loss by falling trees will mean that the fire
policy will provide coverage when the house is crushed but not
when it burns.6 9
Garvey will require a full trial and jury determination of how the
loss occurred before the court can determine which standard of law
to apply to the loss. Then, the jury will have to be re-empaneled to
apply that standard to the loss to determine coverage.7 0 Garvey forces
attorneys to litigate and attempt to prove causation on more than
one standard of law, since they would not know the outcome of the
jury's determination. The costs and confusion that will arise are
endless.
For example, recently, in La Bato v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co.,71 a trial judge and jury struggled with the appropriate instructions for a multiple causation subsidence loss. In 1982, La Bato's
land was damaged when a heavy rainstorm changed the course of a
creek behind plaintiff's home and moved the creek twenty-eight feet
72
closer to the structure.
State Farm denied La Bato's first party claim citing the earth
movement and water exclusions in La Bato's "All-Risk" homeown-

69. Garvey, 48 Cal. 3d at 436, 770 P.2d at 731, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 319 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
70. See Mission Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 210 Cal. App. 3d 484,
258 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1989); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court (Aegea
Homeowners Ass'n Inc.), 264 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1989); La Bato v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co., 215 Cal. App. 3d 336, 263 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1989). See also supra notes 71-90 and
accompanying text.
71. La Bato v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 215 Cal. App. 3d 336, 263 Cal. Rptr.
382 (1989).
72. Id. at 339, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
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er's policy. La Bato argued that numerous covered causes were behind
the loss-rain, high water in the creek, a toppling tree, erosion of
the creek bank, debris in the creek bed, urbanization and changes in
the rate of flow of the creek water.7 3
The trial judge gave a series of jury instructions based on the
Partridge proximate cause analysis. The Court of Appeals for the
First District reversed, claiming that Garvey required instructions to
the jury based on the Sabella analysis. Unfortunately, the court did
74
not enumerate what those instructions should say.
Since the La Bato case was tried prior to the Garvey decision, the
plaintiff argued that Garvey should not be given retroactive effect."The court of appeals dismissed that argument claiming that Garvey
was neither a new rule of law nor did Garvey overrule any prior
76
existing law.
The La Bato case exemplifies the adverse ramifications of Garvey,
but fails to provide meaningful guidelines for interpreting Garvey. If
the case before the court falls into one of the two categories in which
the supreme court has elucidated a standard of law to be applied to
the loss, appropriate instructions can be given and some jury determination can be made using the appropriate test. If the case falls
into one of the two unknown zones, a court will have no standard
of law to apply (outside of the Partridgestandard quietly disapproved
of by the supreme court) to the loss and will not be able to give the
jury any direction whatsoever. Thus, as a practical matter, Garvey
dooms each pending subsidence case to a trial or a low settlement,
forced by the insured's weakened case. La Bato shows that each case
tried previously to Garvey is doomed to retrial if the jury was
instructed according to Partridge.
Although the California Supreme Court has determined that trial
courts should use the Sabella standard again, it has failed to define
that standard for purposes of use in the court system. If the Sabella
standard, as elucidated twenty-five years ago, was as clear as the

73. Id. See, e.g., Judah v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 266 Cal. Rptr. 455 (1990).
In Judah, plaintiff suffered subsidence damage to her home caused by, inter alia, third-party

negligence of the contractor. Id. at 458-59. At the trial, which was pre-Garvey, the court
instructed the jury regarding causation according to the Partridgestandard over the objections
of State Farm which wanted to instruct according to Sabella. Id. at 459. Based on Garvey

and LaBato, the Court of Appeals for the First District overruled the $953,270 judgment for
the plaintiff and ordered the case to be retried with instructions according to Garvey. Id. Like
LaBato, the court rejected plaintiffs estoppel and Garvey-retroactivity arguments. Id. at 459-

60.
74. LaBato, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 341, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 384.

75. Id. at 342, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
76.

744

Id. at 343, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
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supreme court thought it was in Garvey, then courts, including the
supreme court, would not have been confused or concerned with
changing the standard into a workable one.
The California Supreme Court in Garvey recognized this confusion,
yet failed to rectify it. The court stated:
The Court of Appeal here replaced the Sabella term "efficient
proximate cause" with the term "moving cause." Sabella defined
"efficient proximate cause" alternatively as the "one that sets others
in motion" [citation], and as "the predominating or moving efficient
cause." [Citation]. We use the term "efficient proximate cause"
(meaning predominating cause) when referring to the Sabella analysis
because we believe the phrase "moving cause" can be misconstrued
to deny coverage erroneously, particularly when it is understood
literally to mean the "triggering" cause. Indeed, we believe misinterpretation of the underlying Sabella definition of the "efficient
proximate cause" has added to the confusion in the courts and, in
part, is responsible for the erroneous application of Partridge [citation], to first-party property loss cases. 77
In essence, the California Supreme Court has said that it meant
what it said twenty-five years ago and that it means it again today.
But what is the efficient or predominant proximate cause of a loss?
It is the "one that sets others in motion" but it is not the "triggering"
cause or the first cause in the chain of causation. 78 The California
Supreme Court hopes that by explaining what the efficient or predominating cause is not, the lower courts will mysteriously learn
what an efficient or predominating cause is. The La Bato court knew
what was wrong and required reversal, but did not hint as to what
was right. Simply, the subject of the next few years of litigation may
very well be the definitions of the terms used in the Garvey test.
C. Recent Trends in Subsidence Cases

1.

Old Language Policiesz9

Despite Garvey, potential recovery for claimants under old language policies (pre-1983) still exists. In Mission National Insurance

77. Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 48 Cal. 3d 395, 403, 770 P.2d 704, 708,
257 Cal. Rptr. 293, 296.
78. Id.
79. In 1983 and 1984, most insurers rewrote their "All-Risk" homeowner's policies to
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Company v. Coachella Valley Water Districtt 0 the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth District navigated through Garvey to determine whether
or not flood damage to a construction project in a water channel in
the Coachella Valley was covered under an "All-Risk" construction
policy. On August 17, 1983, the construction project in question had
been substantially completed. However, that day, heavy rains caused
damage to the walls and bottom of the project. The damage included

cracking, curvature of the walls, and uplifting of bottom sections
and exceeded $3 million. The policy excluded losses or damages
directly or indirectly caused by, inter alia, design defects. However,
the policy covered damages caused by flood. 1
The jury returned a special verdict finding that the design of the
channel was defective, that the damage to the channel was caused
by the defect, that the defect was the efficient cause of the damage,
that flooding was a cause of the damage, but not the efficient cause,
and that damages caused by the design defect were in excess of $3
million. Based on those findings, the trial court determined that
82
coverage did not exist under the policy.
After struggling with Garvey/Sabella/Partridge,the court of appeals determined that the trial judge erroneously instructed the jury
to determine the triggering cause of the damage rather than the
predominating cause.83 However, the court also found that the jury
ignored the judge and determined the proper result. While the court
found that the jury was right, it also found that the judge was wrong
in denying coverage.8 5 The court reversed the trial court and held
that flood was an included cause of the damage, despite the fact
that the design defect was the efficient proximate cause of the loss.
Coverage existed under the policy since the policy was intended to
cover floods or any damage which a flood contributed to or aggravated. Since the flood contributed to the efficient proximate cause
of the loss, the excluded design defect, the court held that coverage
86
existed.
exclude damage concurrently or proximately caused by third-party negligence. These policies
are commonly referred to as "new language" policies. Policies without the "new language"
exclusions are called "old language" policies. See Katofsky, supra note 1, at 798.
80. Mission Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 210 Cal. App. 3d 484, 258
Cal. Rptr. 639 (1989).
81. Id. at 488, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
82. Id. at 488, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 641.
83. Id. at 495, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 498, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 647.
86. Id.
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Mission exemplifies the confusion which will arise at the trial and
appellate court levels because of the inadequacy of the definitions
and standards set out in Garvey. In Mission, the trial court incorrectly
instructed the jury on the Sabella standard, the jury ignored the
definition and found the proper causes of the loss, and then the
judge applied the incorrect standard to the jury's findings to deny
coverage. The court of appeals then reversed the erroneous trial court
ruling based on the jury's correct findings.
This confusion is also manifested by the recent case of State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court (Aegea Homeowners Ass'n,
Inc.). 87 In Aegea, the Court of Appeal for the Fourth District reversed
the trial court's denial of a summary judgment motion precluding
coverage for the insurer's subsidence claims. In 1978, Aegea Homeowners Association purchased an "All-Risk" homeowner's policy
from State Farm to cover a condominium complex. Over the years,
State Farm continually changed the policy language by adding exclusions. 8 All policies contained language excluding losses caused by
latent or inherent defects in the complex.89
In June 1986, Aegea filed an insurance demand in excess of $3
million because of structural deficiencies including faulty workmanship, building code violations, and builder fraud. State Farm failed
to make a policy determination which forced Aegea to file suit one
year later. In 1988, the City of Oceanside declared the Aegea complex
unsafe, requiring immediate repair for continued occupancy by the
homeowners.90
State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that
Aegea's losses were excluded under the applicable policies. Aegea
responded that the actual loss was the "diminished value of the
building" which was a non-excluded ensuing loss. The trial court
agreed and denied State Farm's summary judgment motion. 91
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth District distinguished the
cases relied upon by Aegea and the lower court which showed that
diminution of market value was an ensuing loss on the basis that
those cases arose out of liability policies (third-party) as opposed to
property policies (first-party). After quoting portions from the Garvey

87. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court (Aegea Homeowners Ass'n, Inc.),
264 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1989).
88.

Id.

89. Id.
90. Id. at 270.
91. Id.
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decision which explained the differences between first and third-party
cases, the court explained:
[t]he Geddes and Eichler cases relied on by Aegea and the trial
court both involved liability insurance and therefore the focus of
the cases was whether there had been an occurrence for which the
insured was liable. Here, the policy is one for property damage,
not liability. The question thus is whether Aegea's losses were caused
by a covered peril. The focus is on causation, not tort liability. In
deciding that question of causation (whether a peril is covered by
a property damage policy), "where there is a concurrence of different causes, the efficient cause- the one that sets the others in
motion-is the cause to which the loss is to be attributed, though
the other causes may follow it, and operate more immediately in
producing the disaster." [citing Garvey and Sabella]. Using this
guideline, it becomes apparent there is no dispute that the efficient
cause of Aegea's losses was one of the excluded perils, i.e., a latent
defect, faulty workmanship, or construction code violation; the
efficient cause was not "diminution in market value."' '
The court's reasoning behind distinguishing Aegea's supporting
case law based on Garvey's separation of first and third party cases
makes some sense. However, in determining what the efficient cause
of the loss actually was and subsequently making a final coverage

determination, the court made little or no sense.
To reverse a previously denied motion for summary judgment, the
court must find that there are no disputed material facts. Aegea
claimed that there were several "causes" of its loss-some were
covered under^ the property policy at issue, some were excluded.
Based on the court's opinion, there were no facts expressed which
could lead to a determination of the efficient cause of the loss. The
efficient cause of the loss, obviously in dispute in this case, is for a
jury to decide using the Garvey framework. Instead, it was improperly
and summarily determined by the appellate court without a factual
basis.
If La Bato and Aegea are what litigants can expect in the future
from the remnants of Garvey, then Justice Mosk may be correct
when he states in his dissenting opinion that:
The majority, I must acknowledge, have succeeded in reaching a
clear result: in this court, the insurer wins and the insureds lose.

92. Id. at 274 (citing Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 51 Cal. 2d
558, 334 P.2d 881 (1959); Eichler Homes, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 238 Cal.
App. 2d 532, 47 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1965)).
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But they have failed to offer a sound rationale in support. They

claim that Sabella establishes a single rule of "efficient proximate
cause" or "predominating cause"; that Partridge is, and should
be, limited to third-party insurance policies; and that in any event

Partridgeis inapplicable on the facts of this case. But as will appear,
none of these claims is well founded. 93
Inevitably, the courts, both trial and appellate, will continue to be
confused by these issues.
2. New Language Policies94
Slowly but surely, the courts are closing the door on homeowners
attempting to recover for subsidence damages under policies which
include language excluding losses concurrently caused or contributed
to by the negligence of a third-party. New language policies foreclose
claimants from suing for subsidence damages in concurrent causation
cases regardless of the standard used since the new language excludes

losses concurrently caused. Since Garvey,95 two federal courts have

upheld these exclusions in new language homeowner's policies.9 6
Courts analyzing coverage issues for concurrently caused subsidence
losses can bypass the Garvey tests by holding that damage concurrently caused with an excluded peril are specifically excluded under
the policy language. The new language has the effect of sidestepping
any Garvey-type test by use of contractual drafting. This is what has
taken place in the courts and by insurers since 1984. Such a practice
was recognized, but not commented on, in Garvey.97
In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Martin,9 8 the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an exclusion in the homeowner's policy for concurrently caused acts, no matter the sequence,
was a valid coverage limitation pursuant to the parties' freedom to
contract. The court also reaffirmed the fact that the exclusion was

93. Garvey, 48 Cal. 3d at 416-17, 770 P.2d at 717, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 305 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
94. See Katofsky, supra note 1, at 798.
95. The remainder of this Article will only discuss cases published after the Garvey
opinion. All cases decided prior to Garvey were discussed in Katofsky, supra note 1, at 798803.
96. Tzung v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 873 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1989); State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Martin, 872 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1989).
97. Garvey, 48 Cal. 3d at 407 n.6, 770 P.2d at 710 n.6, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 298-99 n.6.
98. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Martin, 872 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1989).
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unambiguous. Consequently, the court upheld the district court's
grant of State Farm's summary judgment motion.9
In Tzung v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 100 the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that State Farm's exclusion for
faulty workmanship precluded the Tzungs' claim for subsidence
damages on a concurrent causation theory based on third-party
negligence. Again, the court held that such an exclusion was unambiguous. 10'
Martin and Tzung indicate that insurance carriers have successfully
amended their policies to exclude all potential subsidence claims and
that such drafting has been blessed by the courts. Thus, no Garveytype analyses will be reached or necessary in cases involving losses
occurring under policies containing new language.102
VI. NoTIcE DEFENSES
The Garvey court was not faced with issues regarding the various
notice defenses asserted by carriers to deny subsidence claims. My
prior article discussed, at great length, the effects of the notice
defenses contained within a typical homeowner's policy.' 3 The majority of subsidence cases involving concurrent causation issues under
old language policies will be moot should these notice provisions be
upheld according to the insurers' position. 04 Cases would be deemed
untimely and no cause of loss analysis would be necessary.' 0 Re-

99. Id. at 321.
100. Tzung v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 873 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1989).
101. Id. at 1340.
102. See, e.g., Brodkin v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 217 Cal. App. 3d 210, 265
Cal. Rptr. 710 (1989). In Brodkin, the insureds alleged that subsidence damage to their home
was caused by either: (1) Earth movement; (2) corrosives including cow urine allowed to seep
into the soil and remain there because of improper drainage; or (3) third-party negligence. Id,
at 213, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 711. The insureds contended that the efficient proximate cause of
the loss raised a question of fact. However, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District held
that a Garvey analysis to determine the efficient proximate cause is unnecessary and summary
judgment is proper where each alleged cause of the loss is expressly excluded under the terms
of the new language policy. Id. at 217, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 713-14. The court found that the
insurance policy exclusions clearly and unambiguously excluded each alleged cause of the loss.
Id. at 217-18, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 714. Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court's grant
of summary judgment and denied the insured's claim. Id. at 698.
103. Such limitations include, for example, the requirement for the insured to supply a
"proof of loss" within 60 days of the loss, the 12-month "notice of loss" provision requiring
notice to the carrier, and the 12-month "suit against us" provision limiting the time period
in which suit may be filed. See Katofsky, supra note 1, at 803.
104. See Katofsky, supra note 1, at 803-813 (discussing the notice issues).
105. See Lally v. Allstate Ins. Co., 724 F. Supp. 760 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
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cently, the California Supreme Court has determined that it is time
to end the conflicts in the courts of appeal regarding the notice
defenses by granting review to certain cases adjudicated based on
notice defenses contained in "All-Risk" homeowner's policies. 1°6
The main controversy stems from the determination of when the
loss "began" for purposes of the notice defenses-i.e., when the
ticking of the clock begins. Insureds argue that the statutes do not
begin to run until the manifestation of the damage and its cause or
causes are discoverable. This topic has been one of heated debate

and is currently being widely litigated in the courts without any
consistency among the appellate districts.1°7
The insurance carriers argue that if any noticeable damage existed
prior to the new language becoming effective, then a claim and suit
must be filed within twelve months of the noticeable occurrence of
damage to the home pursuant to the notice requirements of the
homeowner's policy.10 If the claimant argues that the damage occurred after the new language became effective, then the loss is
specifically excluded under the new language policy. The insurance
carriers' position places the insured in a no-win "Catch-22" situation-either argue that the damage began during the period in which
the old language policy was in effect and be barred by the twelvemonth statute of limitations or argue that the damage began more
recently and have it excluded under the express language of the newer
policies. 0 9
A.

Notice Defenses Upheld

1.

California State Courts

Since Garvey, recent cases have struggled with the notice defense
issues. In Prudential-LMI Commercial Insurance v. Superior Court

106. See Fire Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (Johnson), 212 Cal. App. 3d 39, 260 Cal.
Rptr. 299 (1989) (review granted September 21, 1989); Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v.
Superior Court (Lundberg), 211 Cal. App. 3d 1131, 260 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1989) (review granted
September 18, 1989).
107. All applicable case law decided before Garvey was discussed in Katofsky, supra note
1, at 807-11.
108. See CAL. INS. CODE § 2071 (West Supp. 1989).
109. See, e.g., Tzung v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 873 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1989);
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Martin, 872 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1989).

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 21

(Lundberg),"0 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District attempted
to reconcile Garvey with the twelve-month notice of loss policy
provisions and a discovery of the loss analysis. The insureds owned
an apartment building constructed for commercial use. In November
1985, the insureds discovered cracks in the foundation and slab.
They filed a claim in December 1985 with Prudential, who insured
the risk between 1977 and 1980, for continuous subsidence damage
to their complex. The insureds did not file suit against Prudential
until August 26, 1987.111

The court discussed both the progress of the discovery rule in
subsidence cases where the loss is of a continuing nature and the
differences between first and third-party cases as explained by the
Garvey court. The court concluded that:
[A] delayed discovery rule must be applied to the policy requirement
that a claim be made without unnecessary delay and any action
thereon be accordingly filed within one year after "inception of the
loss." To rule otherwise would require claimants to act in protection

110. Prudential-LMI Commerical Ins. v. Superior Court (Lundberg), 211 Cal. App. 3d
1131, 260 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1989) (review granted September 18, 1989). See also State Farm Fire
& Casualty Co. v. Superior Court (Bolek), 210 Cal. App. 3d 604, 258 Cal. Rptr. 413 (1989).
In State Farm, the court upheld State Farm's denial of coverage for subsidence damage to
the insured's home under the "twelve-month suit against us" provision in the homeowner's
policy. The insureds first purchased their home in 1980. In the Fall and Winter of 1982, the
insureds first noticed cracking and settling of the home. From the time they purchased the
house, they were insured under an "All-Risk" homeowners policy from State Farm. In May
1985, the insureds contacted State Farm regarding the problems with the home. State Farm
denied the claim in January of 1986 and reconfirmed in an additional denial letter on February
21, 1986. The insured did not file suit until March 30, 1987. Id. at 607, 258 Cal. Rptr. at
415.
The court held that the 12-month limitation is enforceable and that it is not tolled by the
alleged bad faith handling of the claim. Id. The court also found that the difference in the
insurance policy's use of the term "occurrence" rather than the statutory language of "inception
of the loss" is irrelevant. Id. at 611, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 415. See CAL. INS. CODE § 2071 (West
Supp 1989). See also Katofsky, supra note 1, at 803.
While the court went through painstaking machinations to discuss the recent case law on
the topic and to come to some sort of scholarly conclusion, State Farm was a rather simple
ease. The insureds contacted State Farm in May of 1985. State Farm denied the claim seven
months later. The insureds then asked for reconsideration noting that they had contacted an
attorney, knew of their legal rights and obligations, and understood the type and manner in
which they had suffered a loss. State Farm then reconfirmed its denial in February 1986. State
Farm (Bolek), 210 Cal. App. 3d at 611, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 415. If one counts the twelve
months from the time the claim was made, then the insureds had until May 1986 to file a
suit. In essence, the insureds still had three months to file suit after State Farm had reconfirmed
its denial. If one starts the statute of limitations from the time in which the insureds were
aware of their rights and obligations under the policy, February 1986, then the statute of
limitations would have run in February 1987. The insureds did not file suit against State Farm
until March 30, 1987-untimely under either analysis.
111. Prudential-LMI Commerical Ins. v. Superior Court (Lundberg), 211 Cal. App. 3d
1131, 1137, 260 Cal. Rptr. 85, 86.
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of rights under the policy even if still "blamelessly ignorant" of
the objective facts underlying the claim .... The policy requirement
of notice of loss without unnecessary delay, which gives rise to the
initiation of the contractual limitations period for the bringing of
an action after the "inception of a loss," shall be extended in cases
of continuous and progressive loss by the application of a delayed
2
discovery rule."

The court then determined that the date for filing a claim and a
lawsuit were simultaneous and that such a date would be determined
by a "reasonable person standard. 1 13 In other words, first, discovery

112. Id. at 1139, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
113. Id. at 1154, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 98. See, e.g., Henry v. Associated Indem. Corp., 90
Daily Journal, Daily Appellate Report 1756 (February 20, 1990). Pursuant to California Rules
of Court, rules 976.1 and 976(b), the opinion was published with the exception of the section
discussing the timeliness of the plaintiff's claim-the part of the opinion which applies to this
Article's analysis. The trial court had sustained demurrers to plaintiff's second amended
complaint for subsidence damages to their home without leave to amend based on the 12month "suit against us" provision in the carrier's "All-Risk" policy despite the following
language in the complaint:
The aforementioned property losses occurred in a dual, progressive, continual,
evolving fashion. Plaintiffs did not realize the true extent of the aforesaid damages
and losses until approximately 1987. At no time prior to August 1987 had such
damages and losses manifested to such an extent that they would put a reasonable
person on notice that the insurance claim should be filed.
Id. at 1757 (emphasis in original). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth District distinguished
this case from the facts of Lawrence v. Western Mutual Ins. Co., 204 Cal. App. 3d 565, 251
Cal. Rptr. 319 (1988) and Abari v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 205 Cal. App. 3d 530,
252 Cal. Rptr. 565 (1988) based on Henry's use of the term "recognize" as opposed to
"discovered." Id. at 1760. This language brought Henry's pleading within the mindset of the
court which previously had ruled on the reasonable person standard in Fire Ins. Exchange v.
Superior Court, (Johnson), 212 Cal. App. 3d 38, 260 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1988) (review granted
September 21, 1989) and Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. App.
3d 1131, 260 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1989) (review granted September 18, 1989).
However, the court basically eviscerated the precedential value of the opinion by limiting
its ruling [the following is also included within the depublished portion of the opinion]:
We wish to stress that this pleading presents an extremely close case, and is susceptible
of different interpretations as to whether a cognizable event of damage is pled or a
recognition of the legal significance of damage. However, we are constrained by the
rules of review on dismissals after demurrer to strike the balance in favor of the
plaintiff if he or she has alleged facts showing entitlement to relief from the courts.
[Citation omitted]. We could have resolved this matter by reversing the order of
dismissal and directing the trial court to permit Henry to again amend the complaint,
for example to allege the damage had not manifested to the extent that would place
a reasonable person on notice that damage had occurred, rather than making the
current allegation that manifestation had not occurred to the extent of notifying him
that an insurance claim should be filed. However, on the whole, this pleading fairly
frames the issue of the applicability of the limitations period, adequately pleading
around it, and it would be a wasteful exercise of our discretion to require such a
course of action. The issue of Henry's awareness of the extent of damage can better
be dealt with in a procedural context where factual issues can be addressed, trial or
summary judgment proceedings. Whether Henry will be able to prove his allegations
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of loss is determined under a reasonable person standard; second,
the insured must file a timely claim. Then, the twelve-month notice
of loss provision begins. Using this analysis, the court held that the
insureds' suit was untimely since it was brought eighteen months
after they timely made their claim.
Practically, the application of the discovery of loss rule as announced by the Prudential court is unworkable. Once an insured
files a subsidence claim with its insurer, the insurer needs adequate
time to investigate the loss. Such an investigation usually requires
lengthy soils analysis and field studies of the property. Often, the
insurance adjustment of a subsidence claim takes more than twelve
months to complete. Prudentialrequires the insured to file suit within
twelve months of the filing of a timely claim. In many cases, this
would require the insured to sue its insurer prematurely, before the
insurer has had the opportunity to complete its investigation and
make its coverage decision. This approach would increasingly clog
the courts with lawsuits that are not yet ripe and create adversarial
4
relationships between the parties where none may be necessary.1
Almost every claim will become a lawsuit.
In a case involving the twelve-month "suit against us" provision
in the homeowner's policy, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
District took the analysis several steps further. In Fire Insurance
5 the court, following PruExchange v. Superior Court (Johnson),"1
dential-LMI, held as a matter of law that certain objectively observable facts put the insured on notice of a potential defect in her
property well before the insured made a claim to her carrier. The
insured, who had sued Fire Insurance Exchange for damages caused
by subsidence to her home, testified that she noticed damage to the
rafters in her attic in December 1984. Several months later, she

is not now our concern and we express no opinion on the subject.
Id. at 1761 (emphasis in original). The approach and pleading language required by the court
was that noted in its prior opinion of Home Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 205 Cal. App.
3d 1388, 253 Cal. Rptr. 277 (1988); i.e., was the action brought on the policy within one year
of the time when the damage was sufficient to put a reasonable person on notice of the
possibility of a defect in the property? Henry, 90 Daily Journal, Daily Appellate Report, at

1761. The above quotation seems to direct litigants how to satisfy that pleading. However,
interestingly, the court is now requiring litigants to plead within a case that was admittedly
limited to its facts. Home Insurance, 205 Cal. App. 3d at 1392-96, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 280-82.
114. The "fast-track" rules require service of a summons and complaint within 60 days
of filing. See, e.g. RUtLs OF THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE CoUNTY OF Los ANoLEs § 1106.1.1.
As such, an insured cannot file and hold the complaint to protect its claim in many jurisdictions.
115. Fire Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court (Johnson), 212 Cal. App. 3d 39, 260 Cal. Rptr.
299 (1989) (review granted, September 21, 1989).
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became aware of cracks in the slab, floor walls, and ceilings in her
home. The insured then filed a claim with her existing carrier,
Fireman's Fund, believing that she should complete a claim with that
116
carrier before contacting any former insurers.
Fireman's Fund denied her claim and advised the insured to seek
relief from her prior carriers, including Fire Insurance Exchange.
The insured then filed her claim with Fire Insurance Exchange in
January 1986. That claim was later denied in May 1987. Two months
117
later, the insured filed suit.
The court determined that, under the reasonable person standard
established in Prudential,the damage to the rafters which the insured
noticed and observed in December 1984 put her on notice of a claim
against Fire Insurance Exchange. Therefore, by the time that the
insured notified Fire Insurance Exchange in January 1986, the twelvemonth statute of limitations had already run. 8
Relying almost entirely on Lawrence v. Western Mutual Insurance
Co.," 9 Abari v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,"" and Home
Insurance Co. v. Landmark Insurance Co., 12' the court determined
as a matter of law that the parting of the roof rafters, discovered in
1984, was an objectively observable fact which should have placed
the insured on notice of the possibility of defects in her property. 22
The court then reversed the trial court and granted Fire Insurance
Exchange's motion for summary judgment. 23
Both Prudential-LMI and Fire Insurance Exchange have been
granted review by the California Supreme Court. Finally, the California Supreme Court has decided to resolve the conflict among the
lower courts as to whether a trial judge or an appellate judge should
determine that a crack here or a divot there was an objectively

116. Id. at 42, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 300-01.
117. Id. at 42, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 301.
118. Id. at 48, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 303.
119. Lawrence v. Western Mut. Ins. Co., 204 Cal. App. 3d 565, 251 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1988)
(holding that the notice provisions are not tolled until the insured is aware of a potential
claim, but only until the occurrence of some cognizable event which would lead a reasonable
person to discover the loss).
120. Abari v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 205 Cal. App. 3d 530, 252 Cal. Rptr. 565
(1988) (insured's claim was barred where he failed to plead facts sufficient to show why he
did not file his claim four years earlier when cracks were first noticed).
121. Home Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 205 Cal. App. 3d 1388, 253 Cal. Rptr. 277
(1988) (the first noticeable manifestation of damage is the time when a loss occurs for purposes
of insurance coverage).
122. Fire Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court (Johnson), 212 Cal. App. 3d 46-48, 260 Cal. Rptr.
at 302.

123.

Id. at 48, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
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observable fact which put a reasonable person on notice of a loss.
2. CaliforniaFederal Courts
The overall confusion regarding the notice defense issue is evidenced by the opinion by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California, interpreting California law, in Lally
v. Allstate Insurance Company.2 In the Fall of 1984, Mrs. Lally
discovered cracks in her ceiling and floor. During the following year,
the Lallys hired a geotechnical expert to determine the cause of the
damage.'1 The geotechnical findings were reported in December 1985
and an insurance claim was filed a few months later. Six months
after the claim was filed, the Lallys filed suit. 26 Allstate then filed
a motion for summary judgment claiming that the twelve-month
notice of loss requirement contained within the "All-Risk" policy at
issue barred the loss.
Basing its decision on Prudential-LMI and Fire Insurance Exchange, the District Judge held that the Lallys were in possession of
facts in 1984 which would put a reasonable person on notice of the
defects in the property. 27 This finding ignored the fact that Mrs.
Lally was unaware of the cause of the loss until December 1985, the
time in which the geotechnical reports were completed.
The court then found that the Lallys' waiver argument was unpersuasive. 28 Since the claim was untimely, Allstate's actions, which
might arguably waive its rights to assert the twelve-month limitation
under a Davis analysis, were after the fact. 129 Finally, the court
recognized that there is no need to discuss a coverage analysis under
Garvey, since such a discussion is preempted by the violation of the
twelve-month statute of limitations by the insureds.130
The Lally case has little precedential value since its analysis of the
twelve-month limitation relied on two opinions now being reviewed
by the California Supreme Court. However, the case does exhibit

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
conduct
129.
130.

Lally v. Allstate Ins. Co., 724 F. Supp. 760 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
Id. at 762.
Id.
Id.
Cf. Davis v. State Farm Ins. Co., 252 Cal. Rptr. 595 (1989) (insurance company's
raises estoppel to assert notice defenses).
Lally, 724 F. Supp. at 763.
Id. at 764.
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the grave necessity for a conclusive ruling by the California Supreme
Court in order to end the confusion.
B. Notice Defenses Rejected
Insureds were granted an avenue of relief and not summarily
precluded from recovery because of the notice defenses in Davis v.
State Farm Insurance Company.' In Davis, the Court of Appeal

for the First District held that the insurer could be estopped from
asserting the twelve-month contractual limitations because of its
failure to notify the insureds that third-party negligence in conjunction with flood or earth movement was a covered loss. 32 Each
plaintiff suffered subsidence damages to their property because of

flood and/or earth movement in conjunction with third-party negligence. All plaintiffs were covered under old-language "All-Risk"
33

homeowner's policies.
Although all parties promptly notified their carriers of the losses,
the insurers denied the claims without investigation. 134 The court held

that the insurer had fiduciary duties to disclose potential coverage to
the insured 135 and that it was unreasonable to require lay people to
3
analyze an "All-Risk" policy, especially in light of the Garvey case.1
The court explained that:
the question of coverage in this case depends on a complex question
of law and fact. When courts of law struggle "to enunciate principles
that determine whether coverage exists when excluded and covered
perils interact to cause a loss" [citing Garvey], it seems unreasonable
to require lay insureds to fathom the terms of "all risks" policies.

131. 214 Cal. App. 3d 227, 262 Cal. Rptr. 595 (1989). Davis was consolidated with 11
other similar cases. However, the California Supreme Court subsequently decertified Davis.
CAL. Ruts oF COURT §§ 976(b), 976.1 (West 1989). Consequently, Davis may not be cited as
authority, but is cited here as an illustration of the trends in subsidence coverage issues.
132. Davis v. State Farm Ins. Co., 214 Cal. App. 3d 227, 232, 262 Cal. Rptr. 595, 597.

133. Id. at 229-30, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 597.

134. Id. The court noted that:
[d]espite the fact that an "All-Risk" policy covers flood and/or earth movement
damage where the actual and concurrent proximate cause of such damage is the
negligence of a third party, plaintiffs were informed by the carriers or their agents

that there was no coverage due to the flood and/or earth movement exclusions in
their policies. All claims were denied without investigation. It was not until November
of 1985 that plaintiffs discovered that they may be entitled to coverage for losses if
negligence was the proximate cause of the loss, because such coverage or potential
coverage was kept secret from plaintiffs by defendants.
Id.
135. Id. at 232, 262 Cal. Rptr. 598.
136. Id. at 233, 262 Cal. Rptr. 599.
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Such policyholders should be able to rely on the representations by

insurance carriers as to whether
their damages are in any way
37
covered under their policies.
Such a standard seems to redirect the burden of a reasonable
person standard as enunciated in Prudential-LMI and Fire Insurance
Exchange to the insurer, requiring it to disclose potential coverages
and pursue a full investigation of the loss or be estopped from
asserting the notice defenses. Interestingly, the Davis court utilizes
the complexities of Garvey to shift that burden and show how no
lay person can possibly be expected to analyze the policy in accordance with his losses to determine coverage. While the courts in
Prudential-LMIand FireInsurance Exchange agreed with the insurers
"Catch-22" notice defense argument, essentially dooming all subsidence losses and eviscerating a Garvey analysis, the Davis court left
open some hope for the insured that conduct by the insurer could
waive or estop it from utilizing its notice defenses to defeat a
subsidence claim.
VII.

CONCLUSION

While the issues of law surrounding subsidence losses have been
moving and changing faster than the earth beneath the homes at
issue, they may be travelling in circles. The California Supreme
Court, in Garvey, has reiterated a standard of law to be applied in
concurrent causation cases that dates back to 1963, ignoring or
impliedly overruling the standards that have been used by the courts
over the past two decades. Trial courts and juries cannot determine
whether losses are covered or excluded, by predominating, efficient,
proximate, or moving causes and no one has yet figured out how to
apply the Sabella standard to given facts.
On the other hand, the controversies over concurrent causation
could become moot because of new language policies and the notice
defenses. The appellate courts have foreclosed almost every avenue
of recovery for a claimant under a new language policy. This has
occurred by upholding all new exclusions written by the insurer
intended to counteract California law providing coverage to insureds
for subsidence-type damages caused by third-party negligence in
conjunction with an excluded peril.13 1
137.

Id.

138. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d 94, 514 P.2d 123, 109
Cal. Rptr. 811 (1973).
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Other appellate courts are upholding the one-year statute of limitations by beginning the statutes from dates long past. 13 9 Such precedent forces the insured to make an election-either argue that the
loss began during the old language period and be barred by the
twelve-month statute of limitations or argue that the loss occurred
later, in order to avoid the twelve-month limitation, and be barred
by the new language exclusions. Either way, without definitive answers leading to consistent rulings, insureds and insurers will continue
to clog the courts and spend millions of dollars searching for resolutions.
The California Supreme Court, which has granted review in Prudential-LMI and Fire Insurance Exchange, has four reasonable alternatives: (1) Affirm the reasonable person standard enunciated in
those cases and allow judges to rule on the notice defenses as a
matter of law; (2) return the notice issues to determination by a jury;
(3) set a new standard for courts, insurers and insureds to follow;
or (4) allow the "Catch-22" to stand, essentially foreclosing all
possibility of recovery by an insured for a subsidence loss. The
California Supreme Court must utilize the opportunity offered by
Prudential-LMI and Fire Insurance Exchange to give definitive resolutions to insureds involved in subsidence litigation.

139.

See supra notes 102-38 and accompanying text.

